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Lewis’s (1986a) metaphysics of chance rests on the idea of 
Humean Supervenience (HS). The background is a sparse 
metaphysics: the universe consists of a vast mosaic of spa-
tio-temporally-located particular matters of fact, without 
necessary connections among them. In this vein, chances 
supervene on the whole of local matters of fact throughout 
history. Lewis interprets ‘throughout history’ as superven-
ience on the total course of history, past, present and future. 
This gives rise to the claim that knowing all of history, one 
can know the chances with certainty (cf. Thau 1994, p. 495). 
Lewis adds his Best System Analysis (BSA): chances are de-
termined by the scientific theory which strikes the best bal-
ance of simplicity, strength and fit (cf. Lewis 1994, p. 478). 
For reasons of space, I have to refer the reader elsewhere to 
Lewis’s discussion of the BSA. To give a first idea, the dif-
ference between frequentism, which identifies the chances 
with long-run frequencies, and BSA, may be illustrated by 
Lewis’s ‘unobtainium’ example. There is only one atom of 
this stuff, and it decays at some point in time. Still, there may 
be considerations that allow us to figure out the chances of 
unobtanium decaying, e.g., how unobtainium relates to other 
elements. For the purposes of this article, except for the dis-
cussion of the example in section 3, we may neglect the dif-
ference between frequentism and BSA and think of chances 
as determined by long-run frequencies. 
There is a further ingredient which by Lewis’s light captures 
all we know about chance, the Principal Principle (PP). Let A 
be the proposition that some single event occurs, H history 
up to some point in time, TL the true theory of chance à la 
Lewis, consisting of a set of history-to-chance conditionals 
which specify the chances for different histories, ChHTL(A) the 
chance of A as determined by the combination of H and TL, 
and Cr a reasonable initial credence function (no evidence so 
far). Then:
PP: Cr(A|HTL) = ChHTL(A) (cf. Meacham 2010, p. 410)1
In other words, your credence in A given history H and the 
theory TL is the chance of A according to TL and H.
Now consider a future F, i.e., a total course of future events, 
relative to the present time t which fulfils the following condi-
tions: F would undermine TL. Since TL is true, F does not oc-
cur. But if F were to occur, the chances at t would be different 
from the way they are according to TL. F has a positive chance 
of occurring at t. The possibility of F is backed by Humean 
metaphysics: no tie between the future and the past prevents 
F. According to PP, Cr(F|HtTL) > 0. Yet TL and F are mutually 
inconsistent, so Cr(F|HtTL) = 0. For example, the half-life of 
tritium is 12.32 years. The chance of any given atom of triti-
um of decaying within 12.32 years is 50%. Under HS, no tie 
in the world prevents tritium atoms from displaying a com-
pletely different frequency of decay over time than they have 
hitherto displayed. Thus, there is a minute positive chance 
that they will display this different frequency (cf. Lewis 1994, 
p. 482). Having in mind the link between frequencies and 
chances, we can assume this different frequency gives rise to 
a different half-life of tritium. Since chances are determined 
by frequencies throughout the universe, there is a chance that 
A ‘Big Bad Bug’ threatens Lewis’s Humean metaphysics of chance (Lewis 1986a, p. XIV); his Principal Prin-
ciple provides an intuitive link between chance and credence. Yet on the one hand, certain future develop-
ments are incompatible with the true theory of chance, but on the other hand, such future developments 
have a positive chance to occur. The combination of these two claims with the Principal Principle leads to 
inconsistent credences. I present a Humean solution to the Bug: chances are relative to a limited perspec-
tive. The perspective comprises facts available as evidence to an ideal cognizer at a point in space-time. As 
a consequence, the same future event can have different chances of occurring provided the perspective is 
different. I show how this dissolves the Bug.
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the half-life of tritium is now different from the way it is. That 
means there is a 50% chance that the chance of any given 
atom of tritium decaying within 12.32 years is not 50%. Ap-
plying PP leads to inconsistent credences.
I present a new solution to the Bug which allows the recon-
ciliation of two claims.2 Let T be some true theory of chance 
which is incompatible with F and let X be the proposition that 
the chance of F as determined by Ht is x for x > 0:3
Cr(F|HtT) = 0
Cr(F|X) > 0
The first claim, credence in a future F that would lead to 
chances different from T, given T and the history up to t, 
should be 0, for T and F cannot obtain both. The second claim 
does justice to Humean intuition: even if T is ultimately true, 
at t nothing prevents F. As I will argue, there is a way in which 
Ht already fixes chances, among them the chance of F. These 
chances are different from the chances as represented by T.4 
Knowing just the chances as determined by Ht, one should 
place positive credence in F. 
The argument to come is as follows: in section 2 I advance 
the idea that chances supervene not on the total history of the 
universe, but only on the history up to some point of evalua-
tion; in section 3 I develop the resulting account of chance; in 
section 4 I introduce a revised version of the Principal Princi-
ple; in section 5 I show how this removes the Bug.
2. The Relativity of Chance 
to Perspective: Motivating 
Considerations
I present two motivating considerations. The first alludes to a 
metaphysical conundrum: Bigelow et al. (1993) ask whether 
chances supervene on the total course of history, past, pres-
ent and future, or only on history up to now, past and present. 
Whereas they maintain the latter option, Lewis maintains the 
former.5 Yet it may be in a Humean spirit to wonder in what 
way the future is already ‘there’ such as to determine present 
chances. The past has the advantage of being settled. Even if 
past facts do not any longer exist, they have been perfectly 
determinate and real at their time. Chances may be grounded 
by that reality just as they are grounded in Lewis’s theory by 
the total course of history. But in what way is one privileged 
future, the one that will actually come about, already settled? 
As Lewis says,
‘We tend to regard the future as a multitude of alternative 
possibilities…whereas we regard the past as a unique, settled, 
immutable actuality.’ (Lewis 1986b, p. 36)
Once the future will have come about, how will it be able to 
determine the present chances? There seems to be no way 
for the future to determine past and present facts, no coun-
terfactual dependence, retro-causation or the like.6 The prob-
lem ramifies into the metaphysics of time (cf. Hoefer 2007, p. 
554). Experts favouring presentism and growing block views, 
who deny that the future exists or is determinate now, might 
share my concerns. How can the future fail to exist or be de-
terminate now and nevertheless be a truth-maker for state-
ments about past and present chances? Even eternalists and 
their kin who do not deny that the future somehow exists or 
is determinate might ask how the future manages to influence 
past chances. Unfortunately, from a Humean perspective, ac-
cepting that chances supervene on past and present but not 
on future facts seems to make things worse. Bigelow et al. 
(1993) propose that the past and present facts fix the chances 
once and for all. This claim imposes strong constraints on the 
future. A Humean should doubt that anything could sustain 
these constraints. I do not deem these metaphysical qualms 
decisive,7 but they can be used as prima facie evidence for 
the view I am going to develop: the current chances at some 
point in time t should be determined by history up to t and 
not by the future, but this does not necessarily fix chances as 
being supported by a more comprehensive history.
My second motivational consideration draws on a recent pro-
posal of Jennan Ismael. Ismael denies that chances can be 
reduced to categorical facts. She uses general probabilities 
PrG(A|B) to define the chance of a single event e as evaluated 
from some earlier point in time t:
2. Other solutions have been advocated by Hall (1994), Lewis (1994), Thau (1994), Strevens (1995), Hoefer (1997), Halpin (1998), Roberts (2001), Vranas (2002), 
Schaffer (2003) and Ismael (2008). However, they have not gone uncontested (cf. Briggs 2009).
3. In the account to come, X specifies the chance of F in the perspective attained at Ht.
4. Though the main chance values, for instance the half-life of tritium, may stay the same. 
To be precise, I can only accept some close perspectival analogue of Lewis-chances TL as true, chances as determined by some future course of history which 
encompasses not-F. My conception of chance as determined by total world history somewhat differs from Lewis’s (cf. section 5).
5. At least before and after 1986, cf. Lewis (1986a, p. 112).
6. Lewis denies a backtracking counterfactual dependence of past facts on future facts (in the standard resolution of vagueness for counterfactuals, cf. Lewis 
1986b, p. 34). I surmise that the same should go for facts about chances, although it is not clear how this squares with chances supervening on total history. Should 
not Lewis accept ‘If tritium had displayed a completely different frequency of decay after t, its half-life before t would have been very different’ (cf. Bigelow et al. 
1993, p. 456)? My proposal allows the denial of backtracking counterfactual dependence without unduly restricting the future.
7. They may be assuaged by properly elaborating the metaphysical status of chances: albeit perfectly objective, they do not belong to the basic furniture of the 
world (to which the ban on retro-determination may apply), but are just the most rational way of guiding expectancies.
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Def: Cht(e) =def PrG(e|pre-t history)
where PrG(A|B) is the conditional probability that a random 
pick from the B’s will yield an A. (cf. Ismael 2011, p. 425)
The chance of e is the general probability of picking an 
e-type event from pre-t history. This definition pre-supposes 
a non-relativistic world with an absolute space-time. For a 
relativistic world, Ismael replaces it by a definition of chance 
relative to some point s in space-time:
Def *: Chs(e) =def PrG(e|the contents of s’s past light cone) (Is-
mael 2011, p. 436)8
Ismael’s main motive for conditionalizing on the past (or past 
light cone) as contrasted to the future or total history is epis-
temological:9
‘For creatures like us, historical information is in princi-
ple available, whereas information from the future is out of 
bounds. Chance guides belief because it is probability con-
ditioned on all information that is in principle available to a 
situated agent.’ (Ismael 2011, p. 425)
In principle, we have access to the past (or past light cone) 
but not to the future or the whole of history. PrG(e|…) is de-
termined by the historical frequency of es (cf. Ismael 2011, p. 
128). My proposal relates to Ismael’s as follows: I adapt Is-
mael’s idea of a situated self to Lewis’s Humean framework in 
order to dissolve the Bug. Chances are relative to our location 
in (space-)time and what is principally accessible from that 
location. The metaphysical claim that general probabilities 
are irreducible gives way to Humean supervenience.10 Chanc-
es supervene on the distribution of perfectly natural categori-
cal facts throughout (some part of) the universe.
3. The Perspectival Account 
of Chance
I distinguish the whole of particular matters of fact on which 
Lewis has chances supervene (including the future) from a 
perspective. The perspective comprises that part of the Hu-
mean mosaic which is accessible to an ideal cognizer. The 
ideal cognizer has unlimited cognitive capacities, but her ev-
idence is limited. For she is bound to a point in (space-)time, 
just as we are, and absent a crystal ball, she does not know 
contingent future facts except by their chances as determined 
by the past frequencies. There are follow-up questions about 
how the ideal cognizer is related to a non-ideal cognizer, but 
I think that the former is a good starting point for defining 
an objective notion of chance.11 However, I have to prevent a 
misleading impression: although I talk of the perspective of 
an (ideal) cognizer, the perspective is perfectly objective. It 
consists simply of the particular matters of fact throughout 
some part of the universe. The ideal cognizer is ideal as she 
tracks these particular matters of fact. 
The ideal cognizer occurs only when we consider which 
chances are accessible at some point in history such as to 
guide credence. The lesson of Ismael’s situated self is that we 
need chances to deal with uncertainty about the future, not 
about past and present. Thus, the ideal cognizer captures pre-
cisely the task of taking in all provided information, past and 
present, to deal with uncertainty about the future. The ideal 
cognizer represents the factual basis and analytic powers we 
should try to approximate. Moreover, since the ideal cognizer 
would also have to face the Bug, a principled solution to the 
problem should be expected to apply to her. Thus, even if one 
feels reserved about my idealization, a solution to the ideal 
case should provide guidance towards a solution for non-ide-
al cases. The perspective at t boils down to history up to t Ht, 
or, in a relativistic setting, the past light cone of one’s spa-
tio-temporal location. For brevity, I will content myself with 
discussing the Newtonian paradigm, but I see no principled 
obstacle to a relativistic treatment. 
Here is my proposal: chances are not absolute but relative to 
a perspective. We should not talk of the chances superven-
ing on the Humean mosaic throughout the whole universe. 
There are only chances relative to perspectives forming part 
of the mosaic. Again, the perspective is nothing subjective 
but just some part of the total mosaic of independent facts 
out there. Thus, chances are also perfectly objective. The per-
spective can be made explicit, by talking of the chances rela-
tive to perspective p. The perspective p can be characterized, 
e.g., by listing all the facts available to an ideal cognizer. This 
allows us to detach ourselves from our actual perspective, i.e., 
history up to now, and to talk of chances as determined by 
perspectives that diverge from ours. But our normal talk of 
chances tout court will make implicit reference to our per-
8. I have replaced Ismael’s index ‘p’ by ‘s’ to prevent confusion with my perspective index.
9. Conditionalizing A on B is defined as follows: P(A|B) =def P (A∩B)/P(B) provided P(B)>0.
10. In Ismael’s account, one does not conditionalize on all the facts constituting pre-t history, but only on the observable pre-t frequencies of es, regardless of 
whether they appear typical in light of other, e.g., more fundamental pre-t facts or larger ensembles; conditionalizing is interpreted as bracketing anything except 
the frequencies behind the conditionalization bar. As a consequence, chances seem to be relative to more or less high-level set-ups, as Hoefer (2007) has it.
11. To approximate the ideal cognizer from our perspective, one might adapt the recipes indicated in Roberts (2001) and Ismael (2008). There is a concern that 
these recipes already take care of the Bug. But in light of Briggs’ (2009) reservations, it might be good to have an independent solution to the Bug.
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spective. The chances are always the chances as determined 
by our perspective now. It is a conceptual truth that with any 
change in perspective, the chances are different. 
Chp(A), the chance of A in perspective p is a function from 
two propositions onto the closed unit interval: the proposi-
tion A and a proposition specifying the perspective p, i.e., the 
facts that constitute p. Ch(A), chance tout court, is chance as 
determined by the present perspective.12
Now the question is how chances are determined by part 
of the Humean mosaic. There are several alternatives. For 
instance, I could follow Ismael in using the actual pre-t 
frequencies. Yet I take the following proposal to be most 
straightforward within a Lewisian framework: Lewis’s met-
aphysical claim is that the chances are determined by the 
system which strikes the best balance of simplicity, strength, 
and fit throughout the whole universe (Lewis 1994, pp. 478-
480).13 To evade the psychological vagaries of intuitive 
simplicity, Lewis even expresses hope that one system will 
be robustly best (Lewis 1994, p. 479). The analogous hope 
would be that even for perspectives like our present one, 
there is a best system which settles the chances. This hope 
needs to be motivated. 
It may be motivated as follows: Lewis’s BSA should apply 
both to finite and infinite universes. Consider the closest 
universe to ours which will collapse in a relatively short time 
span (compared to the duration of our universe) from now. 
BSA should apply to such a universe as it is a universe like 
ours (cf. Vranas 2002). Just as our universe up to now, it can 
be expected to be extremely rich and complicated. For the to-
tal history of the collapsing universe, if Lewis is right, there 
should be a robustly best system. Such a universe provides 
a vast, albeit finite, amount of evidence that is available in 
principle but in fact never exhausted by our knowledge. We 
would not hesitate to derive probabilities for a great many 
things, even from a tiny fraction of this evidence. Our actual 
perspective is comparable in structure and complexity to the 
imagined counterpart universe (save for the collapse). There 
is no metaphysical concern that the information available is 
not rich enough to close in on the chances, nor is there an 
epistemological concern that the toil and trouble of figuring 
out the best system is trivialized.14
However, can this motivational consideration be transferred 
from a finite universe to a finite fraction of a larger universe? 
Consider Lewis’s unobtainium isotopes:15 assume Un346 has 
not been instantiated up to t1; after t1, it occurs for the first 
time. My approach might be taken to have an unfortunate 
consequence: in the perspective p1 at t1, the chance of Un346 
occurring Chp1(Un) = 0. In contrast, in some later perspective 
p2, Chp2(Un) > 0. But this positive chance cannot be derived 
from the past chance by conditionalizing on the interval be-
tween t1 and t2. Now it is not clear that Chp1(Un) should be 
0. The best system may yield a determinate value different 
from 0: ‘considerations of symmetry, simplicity and so on can 
make it the case that there are objective chances for events 
that occur seldom, or even never…’ (Hoefer 2007, p. 556). 
Simplicity and strength may bring fundamental facts to bear 
on chances. In Lewis’s example, half of the Un346 atoms decay 
after 4.8 microseconds; we may nevertheless favour a diverg-
ing half-life—provided it accords better with a simple unified 
model of nuclear structure. Alternatively, chances might be 
indeterminate. Still, there might be a case where it is best 
to assign zero chances to an event in a less comprehensive 
perspective, but not in a more comprehensive perspective. In 
reply, what the case of Un346 shows is that chances relative to 
a later perspective cannot be obtained in principle by condi-
tionalizing on chances relative to an earlier perspective. But it 
is not in general the case that Cht2(A) = Cht1(A|I) where I is the 
interval between t1 and the later t2, excluding t1 but including 
t2. The laws of probability hold for chances within a perspec-
tive, but not between chances in different perspectives.
 There is a further problem; Lewis proposes the following 
procedure to evaluate fit: 
‘Lewis suggests evaluating ‘fit’ in terms of the likelihood of 
truths. The higher the chance a system assigns to the true his-
tory (or to segments of it given part of the history) the better 
its fit. So understood, fit is a kind of informativeness appro-
priate for chance. The better a theory fits the facts, the more 
it says about those facts.’ (Loewer 2004, p. 1119)
The problem is that in evaluating fit for a perspective p, I must 
occupy, or at least simulate, a position before p comes to be 
actual. But this position must itself give rise to a perspective 
which is different from p. The chance of events within p are 0 
or 1. Thus, I cannot accept a conceptual link between Lewis’s 
test and fit. I suggest evaluating fit by the relative frequencies 
encountered throughout the perspective, and then weighing 
it against simplicity and strength.
Summing up, I propose that Chp(A) is the probability as-
signed to A by the system which strikes the best combination 
12. Cf. Schaffer’s Chance-formal (Schaffer 2007, p. 115).
13. Instead of discussing these criteria in detail, I refer to Frigg and Hoefer (2010, pp. 259-261).
14. Doubts as to whether chances as determined by a perspective fulfil the chance role will be addressed in sections 6 and 7.
15. ‘It’s hard to make the stuff; in fact in all of space and time, past, present and future, there only ever exist two Un346 atoms: one with a lifetime of 4.8 microseconds, 
as chance would have it; the other with a lifetime of 6.1 microseconds. Exactly half of all Un346 atoms decay in 4.8 microseconds. What does this frequency make 
true concerning the half-life of Un346, in other words concerning the chance that an atom of it will decay in a given time? Next to nothing, I should think.’(Lewis 
1994, p. 477)
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of strength, simplicity and fit relative to p (provided there 
are no further relevant virtues of a theory). Chances are by 
definition indeterminate if there is no unique best system 
which specifies them. To forestall any air of subjectivity, we 
might even define chances to be indeterminate if there is no 
robustly best system. I remain neutral with respect to this 
possibility.
4. The Perspectival  
Principal Principle
How do chances in this conception guide credence? Let X be 
Chp(A) = x, the chance of A from perspective p is x, and E be 
any piece of admissible evidence (relative to Chp(A)):
PPP: Cr(A|EX) = x
Your credence in A given E and X should be x. Note that if 
A forms part of p, its chance in perspective p is 1. I offer the 
following working characterization of admissible evidence: 
E must not support the claim that the chance of A is differ-
ent from x in some perspective which is at least as compre-
hensive as p.16 For instance, to set our credence in a certain 
coin falling heads to 0.5 as the present perspective has it, 
we should not have evidence that the chance is 1/3 in some 
future perspective. 
One does not choose a perspective, but is bound to it, just 
as one does not choose one’s position in time. One can only 
simulate but not occupy a past or future perspective. Moving 
forward in time, one automatically proceeds from a less to a 
more comprehensive perspective, which makes new relevant 
data available. A more comprehensive future perspective 
overrides any less comprehensive one in guiding credence.
The chance-credence link proposed is limited compared to 
Lewis’s. He envisages a kinematics of belief which essentially 
proceeds by conditionalization. p being Lewis-chance as giv-
en by TL, I some time interval, excluding the present time t1 
but including t2, he maintains:
P2(A) = Cr(A|H2TL) = Cr(A|H1ITL) = P1(A|I)  
(cf. Lewis 1986a, p. 107)
In contrast, the transition from chances in one perspective to 
chances in another perspective cannot be achieved by con-
ditionalization. One at least in principle needs a completely 
new theory of chance which strikes the best balance of sim-
plicity, strength and fit with observed frequencies at any point 
in time. Consider chances as given by perspective p2 which at 
t2 will succeed p1, the original perspective at t1. In principle, 
these chances must be derived from the facts assembled in the 
new perspective and cannot be attained by conditionalizing 
on chances relative to the earlier one. For if an undermining 
future comes to pass, the new perspective revamps the very 
chances that would be used to figure out the new chances.17 In 
general, the laws of probability hold within a perspective, but 
not between chances in different perspectives. 
At first glance, this result might seem hard to swallow. Yet 
consider when we normally use conditionalization. Assume 
you bet now (at t1) that the next 10 tosses of a coin will be 
all heads. You want to know your chances of winning after 
the next five tosses will have turned out heads at t2. To see 
whether conditionalization might lead you astray, you may 
invoke a perspectival admissibility constraint (which you 
would not need in Lewis’s kinematics). Provided the next five 
tosses falling heads do not amount to inadmissible evidence, 
you may settle your present (t1) credence in your eventually 
winning by conditionalization. You conditionalize on the five 
tosses falling heads:18 
Cr(10 heads|p1(5 heads)) = Chp1(10 heads|5 heads)
This equation holds only provided the five heads do not 
amount to inadmissible evidence: evidence that the chance of 
10 heads in the perspective p2 that will be attained after five 
consecutive heads, Chp2(10 heads), is different from condi-
tional chances in the present perspective p1, Chp1(10 heads|5 
heads). Now suppose that the same goes for the whole part 
of relevant history forming the interval I between p1 and p2. 
I does not amount to evidence that the chance of future coin 
tosses turning out heads is different in p2. Then we get some-
thing very close to Lewis’s kinematics:
16. Except for the disjunctive truth that in some sufficiently comprehensive perspective, the chance of A will be 1 or 0, of course. My working characterization is a 
perspectival analogue of a criterion of admissibility considered by Strevens (PT(A) being the Lewis-chance of A): ‘…if a proposition B is to be admissible, it must 
also be the case that B conjoined with T[L] tells us no more about A than does PT(A).’(Strevens 1995, p. 551)
My working characterization also allows the handling of crystal balls (cf. Strevens 1995, 552; Hall 2004, p. 515-516; Meacham 2010, p. 415-416). Information 
obtained by a crystal ball is inadmissible precisely as far as it provides evidence that the chance of A in some perspective, which is more comprehensive than p, is 
different from Chp(A). For instance, if a perfectly reliable crystal ball tells you that a coin which is fair from p will not fall heads, it thereby tells you that the chance 
of heads will be zero in some future perspective. Thus, it is inadmissible relative to Chp(heads).
17. The new perspective replaces the original one. But that does not mean that the original perspective entailed the wrong chances, of course. From that perspective, 
these chances were perfectly in order. But from the later one, they are no longer fitting.
18. ‘10 heads’ means ‘the next 10 tosses of the coin will be 10 times heads’, ‘5 heads’ means ‘the next five tosses of the coin will be five times heads’.
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Cr(10 heads|p1I) = Chp1(10 heads|I) = Chp2(10 heads)
In my view, this is how we normally use conditionaliza-
tion. The admissibility clause just considered will be ful-
filled: future events we conditionalize on will be short run 
compared to the huge evidence assembled in our present 
perspective.19 Even when we cannot precisely evaluate the 
chance of an undermining future, we usually can rough-
ly assess how big a fraction of the universe would have to 
be to amount to an undermining future. We can safely use 
conditionalization as long as the fraction considered does 
not reach this dimension.20
But what if the evidence is inadmissible? What about per-
spectives which are rich enough to comprise undermining 
futures? What if small transitions attained via conditionaliza-
tion add up? We need a general recipe for figuring out chanc-
es in a later perspective compared to an earlier perspective 
and to double-check the results of conditionalization. I do not 
think that conditionalization is indispensable in order to pro-
ceed from one perspective to the other. To develop a theory of 
chance in the first place, you begin by just counting frequen-
cies contained in a perspective  p1. Once your evidence base 
is sufficient, you can develop an account of chances in that 
perspective. After some time, you want to consider chances 
in a new perspective  p2. If you know the interval I, you there-
by know the newly encountered frequencies. You just have to 
combine the newly encountered frequencies with those con-
tained in the original perspective  p1 and balance the overall 
frequencies against other virtues of a theory of chance, like 
simplicity and strength. If the interval undermines chances 
as delivered by  p1, you will obtain new chances for p2 which 
diverge from the kinematics obtained by conditionalization. 
The same procedure can be applied to figuring out chances 
for hypothetical future intervals. 
In sum, conditionalization can be used to proceed from one 
perspective to the other. However, such a use is limited to 
perspectives which bear no risk of an undermining future. 
This recalls Carl Hoefer’s suggestion that the application of 
PP should be restricted ‘to small parts of the overall pattern of 
events’, such that undermining futures do not come into view 
(Hoefer 1997, p. 333). The perspectival admissibility clause 
serves a comparable task. Provided the interval I is not too 
large compared to the original perspective  p1, you can be fair-
ly confident that the new perspective  p2 will not yet be suffi-
cient to undermine chances as given by  p1. These small-scale 
transitions will probably be those you are usually interested 
in. However, this way of using conditionalization is limited. 
The tiny transitions should not add up. The larger the parts of 
the universe considered, the more pressing the requirement 
to double-check the results of conditionalization against new-
ly encountered frequencies. 
Perhaps one is dissatisfied with the resulting limits of con-
ditionalization. I discuss a way of removing the limitations 
imposed on conditionalization: one may adopt a suitable 
uniformity presumption. But how are we to handle such a 
presumption? As Humeans, we have to accept the possibility 
that it leads us astray if an undermining future occurs. In my 
view, the consequence is that the chance of an undermining 
future, as seen from the present perspective, is positive, and 
so should our credence be. If we were to place full (or almost 
full) credence in the uniformity presumption, an inconsist-
ency would ensue. The Bug would rise again. As long as we 
place positive credence in an undermining future, we can-
not place full credence in nature being uniform. If we nev-
ertheless use conditionalization, drawing on the uniformity 
presumption, we should be fully aware that our heuristic 
practice will miss the true chances if an undermining future 
occurs. The actual frequencies encountered in the perspec-
tive approximated by conditionalization may prove the uni-
formity presumption wrong. 
But if we cannot simply be confident that nature will be uni-
form, what could vindicate acting as if it were uniform? By 
way of an example, I consider a pragmatic stance towards 
epistemic justification, as proposed by Joshua Schechter and 
David Enoch: 
‘Given a project that we are rationally required to engage in, 
and given a belief-forming method that we must employ if we 
are to engage successfully in that project, we are justified in 
employing the method.’ (Schechter and Enoch 2006, p. 707)
To Schechter and Enoch, we are justified in adopting any 
method which is indispensable to successfully pursuing a 
project which we are rationally required to pursue. What 
Schechter and Enoch have in mind are very basic methods 
like reasoning according to Modus Ponens (MP) and Infer-
ence to the Best Explanation (IBE). Their notion of a rational 
requirement is comparably basic. Now if there is any such ba-
sic requirement, decision-making in a normal environment 
is a good candidate: success depends on chancy future events 
and one’s evidence is always finite. Just as far as a uniform-
ity presumption is a prerequisite of coping with uncertainty 
about the future, we may be justified to use it. One interesting 
feature of Schechter and Enoch’s paradigm of justification is 
19. The assumption that our perspective will usually be sufficiently large also assuages the limits of conditionalization illustrated by the unobtainium example in 
the last section.
20. This can be better appreciated if we look at the fundamental chances Lewis has in mind, instead of the toy example of a coin toss. For instance, it would need 
a huge amount of tritium decays to contravene the overwhelmingly many tritium decays which have taken place throughout history until now in determining 
chances. In the coin example, even disregarding problems with high-level chance set-ups, we do not just have to attend to the individual tosses of this coin but the 
overall physical theory bearing on the physical make-up of the coin.
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that one may have low confidence in the reliability of some 
method of belief formation and still be justified in using it, 
provided there is no better way to pursue a project one is ra-
tionally required to pursue.21 One acts as if nature were uni-
form because one knows that there is no other road to suc-
cess, even if it is open as to whether the remaining road, too, 
is ultimately barred by undermining futures. 
Still, I feel doubts about this pragmatic line of vindicating 
conditionalization between perspectives. What would be at-
tained at best is not conditionalization unlimited, but only 
conditionalization as a prerequisite of a project we are ra-
tionally required to engage in. Moreover, Humean metaphys-
ics prevents us from simply placing high credence in nature 
being uniform, or related metaphysical posits which are en-
tailed by the uniformity presumption. The pragmatic line of 
justification would have to be reconciled with the resulting 
detachment. Perhaps there are other justificatory strategies. 
For instance, one might exploit the relationship to uniformity 
as a prerequisite of inductive reasoning (cf. Strevens 1999, 
p. 257 and section 6). But the pragmatic line of argument il-
lustrates one general concern about any such strategy: it will 
prove very difficult to spell out a reasoned attitude towards 
the uniformity presumption. Such an attitude would have to 
steer in between the commitment to uniformity incurred by 
using conditionalization as a heuristic and the detachment 
required by Humean metaphysics. I do not see a convincing 
way of elucidating such an attitude. One might try some sort 
of ‘as if’-stance towards uniformity, or treat chances obtained 
by conditionalization as some sort of idealization. Yet it is be-
yond the scope of this paper to thoroughly consider such pos-
sibilities, especially since I surmise that conditionalization 
within the limits of the perspectival admissibility clause will 
mostly suffice. Again, this only amounts to limiting the use of 
conditionalization and not to limiting PPP. There is always 
the alternative of proceeding from one perspective to the oth-
er by just counting frequencies.
5. Removing the Bug
Now I feel prepared for meeting the Bug: future events can-
not undermine present chances. Consider a future F relative 
to the present time t that would undermine some true theory 
of chance T.22 Since F and T are incompatible, Cr(F|HtT) = 0. 
Given T will come true, F will not come to pass. Our credence 
in F given T should be 0.
However, Humean intuition is preserved; none of the futures 
which would undermine T are precluded from having a pos-
itive chance to occur at t and from having an impact on our 
assignment of chances. Assume F now has a chance of under-
mining T. Its positive chance Ch(F) = Chpt(F) is not derived 
from T, but from the true theory in our present perspective 
pt. My credence that F will occur as guided by my present 
perspective  pt should equal this chance, Cr(F|Ch(F)=x) = x. 
What prevents the Bug is that there is no reason to assign 
zero credence. No future whatsoever can make chances in a 
past perspective false. My proposal diverges from the posi-
tion of the majority of eminent Bug hunters (Vranas 2002): 
while they either deem F inscrutable or recommend zero 
credence, I opt for non-zero credence. I think this is more 
plausible, provided we accept that nothing prevents F from 
coming to pass. 
To illustrate my treatment, I consider a toy example of Hoefer’s:
Scenario: The end of the world is near. There are just 10 more 
chance events of type Q left in history (think of them as be-
ing, in structure, like flips of a coin). In past history, there have 
been 30 and exactly 15 were ‘heads’, nicely distributed tempo-
rally. Depending on how the last 10 turn out, the probabilistic 
laws may take form T (if anywhere from one to nine Q-events 
are ‘heads’), T´ (if zero are ‘heads’), or T´́  (if 10 are ‘heads’). 
For concreteness, let us suppose these laws are as follows: 
T: Each Q has chance 1/2 of being ‘heads’, and 1/2 of 
being ‘tails’
T´: Each Q has chance 1/3 of being ‘heads’, and 2/3 
of being ‘tails’ 
T´́ : Each Q has chance 2/3 of being ‘heads’, and 1/3 
of being ‘tails’ 
In fact, in the world in question, four are ‘heads’ and T are the 
laws. But T assigns a non-zero chance to both the zero-heads 
and 10-heads outcomes […]
Question: What credences in possible future outcomes 
should a good Humean, knowing Htw, Tw, and E in these cir-
cumstances, have? 
21. In more recent work, Enoch and Schechter elaborate the conditions of pragmatic justification as follows: consider a method of forming beliefs which is 
indispensable to a project one is rationally required to engage in. The method is justified provided that (i) ‘if any method yields success, this one does, too’ (Enoch 
and Schechter 2008, p. 560); (ii) ‘there is no sufficiently close world at which the thinker successfully engages in the project but at which the method is ineffective’ 
(Enoch and Schechter 2008, p. 562). This fits the indispensable role I have tentatively envisaged for the uniformity presumption. Yet no requirement can be derived 
that adopting this presumption actually leads to successfully forming credences. So justification à la Enoch and Schechter is compatible in principle with low 
confidence that the uniformity presumption will actually be fulfilled.
22. As a perspectival approximation to Lewis-chances TL, one may think of T as chances in some advanced future perspective from which it will be settled whether 
F has occurred.
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Right Answer: A good Humean knows only that one of the 
one-to-nine ‘heads’ outcomes will happen. She has no reason 
whatsoever to assign more credence to one than to another 
(Hoefer 1997, p. 329).
To Hoefer, what the ‘good Humean’ can do is settle conditional 
credence in heads given Lewis-chances TL.23 There is one diffi-
culty with adapting the example to my account. The perspec-
tive corresponding to Lewis-chances comes about at the end 
of the universe. If it is part of the perspective that the universe 
has come to an end, the chance of any past heads outcome is 0 
or 1 and there is no chance of a further heads outcome. There-
fore I vary the example: at t2, Hoefer’s 10 tosses have taken 
place; but there is one further coin toss which will not make a 
difference to the ultimate theory. I will interpret T as true from 
the respective perspective (and analogously T´…). Assume the 
perspective p1 (at t1) when Hoefer’s 10 trials are still to occur 
sustains a best system of chances T1 (let the chance of heads be 
0.5). We should assign positive credence to futures that would 
undermine T: there is a chance that the next 10 trials will end 
no heads and all heads: e.g. Cr(no heads|p1) = Chp1(no heads) 
= 0.510. This does not lead to a contradiction, though. For con-
sider an undermining outcome. Say none of the 10 trials has 
issued in heads at t2. This gives rise to a different perspective p2 
and a different theory, Hoefer’s T´. But this is compatible with 
Cr(no heads|T) = 0. And it is compatible with the true chanc-
es relative to p1 being T1 and with positive credence in some 
heads at t1. Now consider the toss after t2. While Cr(heads|p1) 
= Chp1(heads) = 0.5, Cr(heads|p2) = Chp2(heads) = 1/3. One 
may assign non-zero credence to undermining futures from 
an earlier perspective, just as the original Humean intuition 
which bothered Lewis has it, for the relativity to a perspective 
prevents inconsistencies. 
To sum up, Humean chances can be debugged by an account 
of chance which is independently motivated, by considering 
the limited part of history accessible to cognizers situated in 
time and reinterpreting this limited base as not just providing 
an evidential base for figuring out, but as determining objec-
tive chances.
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